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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

J. R. STONE COMPANY, INC.,
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment with
respect to the meaning of an Option to Purchase real property
granted by plaintiff to defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court declined to enter specific performance
sought by both parties on their version of the meaning of an
Option to Purchase real property, and entered a declaratory
judgment construing the provisions of the Option, and refused
to declare the Option void

or award damages.

THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent requests this Court to affirm
the trial court in all respects.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent accepts as the Statement of Facts the
lower court's Findings of Fact

(amended) at page 156 of the Record,·

Respondent takes exception to the additional facts in appellant's
Statement of Facts because appellant repeatedly accepts the lower
court's findings in its brief.

Appellan'~ u r ges th"is

c ourt

to rely

upon the trial court's findings since individual testimony was
challenged by both parties for credibility.
summarized briefly as follows.

The facts may be

Defendant owned Fiber Glass

Products, Inc., which manufactured fiber glass air filter material
in Salt Lake City.
building.

He needed additional working capital and a

n~

He contacted Gerald R. Turner, an attorney, who

assisted him to obtain financing through Valley Bank & Trust
guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (S.B.A.).

Turner

told defendant that they needed a third party to own the building,
and he recommended John R. Stone, his brother-in-law.
formed J. R. Stone Company, Inc., the plaintiff

Turner

(appellant) herein.

Defendant's company signed a lease for a building to be constructed
and owned by plaintiff, and plaintiff obtained a construction loan
from Valley Bank.

The cost on the building exceeded the amount

of the construction loan, so the balance was paid by defendant's
company, which also paid for lease guarantee insurance to amortize
the construction loan.

Turner prepared an option signed by the

parties herein granting defendant an option to purchase the new
building at any time within 14 years from and after September
1971.

3o,

on September 8, 1975, defendant attempted to exercise the
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option at the price he calculated.

Plaintiff refused to

acknowledge that price, and set a different one.

The

lower court held that neither position was correct and
held that the option could be exercised at the price
stated by the lower court in its declaratory judgment
about the meaning of the words used in the option document.
As regards plaintiff's claimed "closing", described
on page 9 of plaintiff-appellant's brief, counsel for both
parties met and discussed their interpretations of the
option agreement.

Thereafter, this action was commenced.

As indicated at page 179 of the Record, defendant attempted
to obtain the lower court's assistance in enforcing a
.tender in accordance with the court's decision.

The lower

court's Findings do not support the appellant's position
that defendant Keate acted in bad faith in this matter.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED IN REFUSING
TO DECLARE THE OPTION VOID.
The lower court held that neither party was entitled
to damages or specific performance, and that defendant was
.
not entitled to re f orma t ion.

The lower court further held that

neither attempt to exercise was correct because of an ambiguity
in the document prepared by Attorney Turner.

Because neither
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-4party had properly construed the option, and attempts to
exercise and responses while in good faith were not in
accordance with the requirement of the document as
interpreted by the Court, the Court properly refused to
declare the option void.
The defendant, in his Notice of Exercise of Opti~
(Exhibit 5-P), took the position that the purchase price
for the option was the mortgage balance plus 10% of the
mortgage balance, and that no liens could exceed the
purchase price.

Plaintiff, however, took the position in

its reply letter through counsel (Exhibit 6-P) that the
purchase price was $137,500 plus defendant had to assume
any and all the liens of record, includi~g the constructioo
lien to Valley Bank & Trust Company.
The Court interpreted the option as meaning that
defendant would have to pay plaintiff $12,500 (10% of the
original mortgage of $125,000), plus $125,000, out of which
the construction loan must be paid, and defendant takes the
property subject to remaining liens and encumbrances of
record as of the date of the decision of the Court.

The

Court also held that defendant had a choice of assuming the
construction loan and paying plaintiff the balance of
equity held by plaintiff.
Since the Ccurt held that the Option document
(Exhibit 3-P) was ambiguous, and that neither the attempt
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-5to exercise (Exhibit 5-P) nor the response (Exhibit 6-P) were
accurate, that the Option is still valid and may be
exercised in accordance with the Court's judgment until
the Option expires on its own terms on September 30, 1985.
The Court held that the attempted exercise of the
Option by defendant was not in accordance with the correct
construction of the document because language in the document
is ambiguous.

The ambiguity was created by the author of the

document, Attorney Gerald R. Turner, who acted in the transaction for all parties.

Keate did not create the ambiguity,

it exists in the language of the document.
Appellant argues, on page 13 of its brief, that
the option is a continuing offer which
letter, Exhibit 5-P.

w~s

accepted by defendant's

The Exhibit 5-P was not an acceptance

of the option according to the trial court, and the trial
court refused to give defendant a deed as requested by
defendant.

Thus, the offer never became a contract as argued

by appellant, and is still open to defendant to exercise in
the manner prescribed by the trial court.
Appellant argues in the alternative that the option
was refused and rejected.

The Court held that defendant's

attempted exercise, and plaintiff's attempted acceptance,
were frustrated by an ambiguity in the document.

Further,

at the time of the attempted exercise, defendant believed that
plaintiff through its president John Stone and his brother-in-law
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-6Turner, had defrauded defendant in the transaction, and
was entitled to construe the ambiguity created by Turner
in his favor.

The terms of defendant's attempted exercise

are clearly warranted by certain of the language of Exhihlt
3-P.

The Court stated in announcing its decision that "I

believe that either party here taking a stand on it is
justified in questioning that instrument."
you have to come to Court."

"I think one of

"I think you were both justifa

in taking the positions you did not in its entirety.

But!

think the option agreement itself is ambiguous enough as
cited it when you look at it as a whole."

(TR 3/25/76

P. 15 lines 29-30, p. 16, lines 8-9 and 17).
The attempted exercise was in good faith, and it
was not construed

by the lower court as a counter-proposa.

in the light of the ambiguity of the document.

Defendant

has at no time intentionally rejected the option agreement'
refused to

comply

with its terms, and asked the Court for'

declaratory judgment in the alternative so that a proper ex'
cise could be made.
The actions of the trial court are justified unde:
the holding in Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.M
327 (1970), and the clarification of the option language wa:
proper and within accepted rules of construction to all~!
evidence of what the parties meant by what they said in the
document.

Green v. Sprague Ranches, 339 P. 2d 607, 610 (l~'

and authorities cited therein.
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-7-Appellant then asserts in the alternative that
the option was not exercised and was later revoked by appellant, and asserts a lack of consideration.

It is clear

from the evidence that Keate was personally obligated on the
loans involved, and was the principal officer and majority
shareholder in Fiber Glass Products.

He also provided sub-

stantial funds for the additional costs of construction of
the building, supervised the construction, and obtained lease
guarantee insurance for the building.

Keate gave more than

adequate consideration for the option; Stone Company gave
Keate little for the no-risk equity build-up position it
obtained through Keate's efforts.

TR 3/22/76 Vol. I. p. 39,

lines 26-30; p. 36, lines 26-28; p. 33, lines 1-3; TR
3/25/76 Vol. III, pp. 3-14; TR 3/24/76, pp. 94-97.
POINT II. EXERCISE OF THE OPTION IS
NOT BARRED BY LACHES.
The Option Agreement, Exhibit 3-P, specifically
provides that it may be exercised at any time within fourteen
years after the date of the option.

The Court proceeded with

a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of the language of
the Option and whether the lien to Lockhart Company for clean-

~p was a lien which should be paid for by Keate.

There is

no reformation involved in the relief granted by the Court,
and chus no exercise of the Co~rt's equity jurisdiction.

The

Court considered the plaintiff's claim for equitable relief
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in the form of laches and denied the same.

The Court like-

wise denied defendant's requec:t
for re f orma ti· on, or other
equitable relief based upon fraud.

'l'h e

c ourt

d"d
i
allow tie

lien to Lockhart Company for $15,000 plus interest to st~~
the building, even though some of those funds included moni;
paid to plaintiff's employees.
The trial court properly refused to apply the
doctrine of laches in this case.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
CONSTRUED THE TERMS OF THE LEASE IN REGARD
TO LIENS.
The purported lien claimed by appellant for an
unrecorded lien in behalf of Mr. Stone and his father, was
properly refused by the trial court.

The evidence in this

matter was uncertain regarding all of the expenditures made
with the Lockhart lien funds, and of which expenditures went
to normal wear and tear caused· for use of the building as
a manufacturing plant.

There was conflicting testimony as~

the ligi timate costs of cleanup of the building and which
sums were proper.

Further, the evidence indicated that afte·

defendant's company employees and the S. B .A. secured the
building, vandals broke into the building and damaged the
premises.

The trial court carefully considered the extensi(

evidence presented on the question of proper cleanup expense
and declined to impose an equitable lien based upon its vie•
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That ruling was proper and should not now

be overturned.

CONCLUSION
The record in this matter is extensive.

The trial

court declined to find fraud, and declined other equitable
relief.

Its ruling is fully supported by the admissible

evidence, and both parties had full and fair opportunities
to present their claims.

While different readings of portions

of the record might support differing points of view, the
record as a whole fully and conclusively sustains the
decision of the trial court.

A

serious question

in this

matter was the truthfulness of the testimony of individual
witnesses.

The credibility of each individual witness was

weighed by the trial court, and its findings of fact fully
support the judgment.
DATED this

-Z. ~ J

day of August, 1977.

Respectfully submitted,
WATKINS & FABER

By

~·
DaVidLiOYd

~-~~~~~~

Attorneys for befendant-Respondent
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
~elephone:
363-4491
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